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NOTE
LIMITING A CONSTITUTIONAL TORT WITHOUT
PROBABLE CAUSE: FIRST AMENDMENT RETALIATORY
ARREST AFTER HARTMAN
Colin P. Watson*
Federal law provides a cause of action for individuals who are the
target of adverse state action taken in retaliation for their exercise
of First Amendment rights. Because these constitutional torts are
"easy to allege and hard to disprove," they raise difficult questions
concerning the proper balance between allowing meaningful access
to the courts and protecting government agents from frivolous and
vexatious litigation. In its recent decision in Hartman v. Moore, the
U.S. Supreme Court tipped the scales in favor of the state in one
subset of First Amendment retaliation actions by holding that plain-
tiffs in actions for retaliatory prosecution must plead and prove a
lack of probable cause for pressing the underlying charge as an
element of their claim. This Note argues that a careful reading of
Hartman demonstrates that, despite the recent holdings and dicta of
several courts, Hartman neither requires nor supports a rule that
the presence of probable cause for effectuating the underlying ar-
rest precludes a claim for First Amendment retaliatory arrest (the
"no-probable-cause rule"). This Note also seeks to demonstrate
that pre-Hartman cases applying the no-probable-cause rule in ac-
tions for retaliatory arrest are bad law. After freeing courts from the
constraints of Hartman and pre-Hartman circuit precedent, this
Note argues that both legal arguments and policy considerations
counsel against application of the no-probable-cause rule in ac-
tions for retaliatory arrest.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IN TRODU CTIO N ...................................................................................... 112
I. HARTMAN: INAPPLICABLE IN THE ARREST CONTEXT ............... 116
A. Hartman Depends on the Presence of Objective
Probable Cause Evidence and the "Causal Gap" ........ 117
* J.D. candidate, May 2009. 1 would like to thank my Note Editor, Margaret Barry, and the
rest of the Volume 106 Notes Office, especially Brittany Parling, Benedict Schweigert, and Leigh
Wasserstrom, for helping this Note through the publication process. I would also like to thank Kathryn
Drenning for her contribution during the read process. Finally, I would like to thank Eric White for
helpful comments on an early draft.
Michigan Law Review
1. The Facts ..................................................................... 117
2. The Result Depends on the Availability of Objective,
Probative Probable Cause Evidence ........................... 118
3. The Result Depends on the "Causal Gap"
that Makes Proving Lack of Probable
Cause N ecessary ......................................................... 119
B. Hartman Does Not Control Because the "Causal Gap"
Does Not Characterize the Arrest Action ........................... 121
II. No PERSUASIVE LEGAL ARGUMENT EXISTS FOR IMPOSING
THE No-PROBABLE-CAUSE RULE IN ARREST ACTIONS ............ 123
A. The Presence of Probable Cause Does Not Prevent
Plaintiffs from Proving the Causation Element ................. 123
B. Cases Applying the No-Probable-Cause Rule
Pre-Hartman Are Unpersuasive ......................................... 126
III. PROPONENTS HAVE NOT ARTICULATED A PERSUASIVE
POLICY RATIONALE FOR APPLYING THE RULE
IN A RREST A CTIONS .................................................................. 128
A. Courts Can Manage Arrest Actions Without Making
the Claim More Difficult to Plead and Prove .................... 129
B. Courts Should Not Fear a Surge in Retaliatory-
A rrest A ctions .................................................................... 130
C O N CLU SION .......................................................................................... 132
INTRODUCTION
John Q. Activist is a well-known, if not notorious, government critic in
the city of Hutchins. John earns income as a freelance food critic but spends
much of his time writing, publishing, and distributing a weekly newsletter
identifying and decrying the wasteful government spending of Hutchins's
tax dollars. Of late, John has been particularly critical of the Hutchins Police
Department's purchase of costly consulting services from Homeland Secu-
rity Inc. John has claimed in print that the city did not bid the consulting
contract competitively because of a romantic relationship between Police
Chief Berkeley and Homeland's vice president of community relations.
Both Hutchins and Chief Berkeley have denied the allegation.
Several weeks ago, while John was driving home from a long evening of
editing at his downtown office, a Hutchins police officer pulled him over for
failing to fully stop at a stop sign. John was clearly tired-his eyes were
bloodshot and he was unable to give the exact hour or date. John explained
to the officer that he had been up all night at his office attempting to meet a
publishing deadline. The officer was finishing providing John with a warn-
ing regarding the dangers of driving while fatigued-preparing to let John
leave without a ticket-when he noticed a stack of John's Hutchins Ac-
countability Weekly newsletters piled on the passenger seat. The officer
immediately recognized John as a local agitator and his demeanor shifted.
The officer said John looked like he had been drinking and smelled a bit
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odd-maybe like alcohol. The officer asked John to get out of the car and,
as he placed him under arrest for suspicion of drunk driving in violation of
Hutchins law, remarked that "I hope this doesn't affect your ability to get
that dishonest rag of yours to all your socialist friends in time for your next
meeting."
John, freed from jail after ten long hours and no charges, was intimi-
dated. Believing himself the victim of an arrest made solely to punish him
for his irreverent reporting and to deter him from criticizing Hutchins offi-
cials in the future, John filed suit in federal district court. He cited the
arresting officer's shift in demeanor and threatening reference to his work to
support his contention that his arrest was unconstitutional retaliation for his
exercise of his First Amendment right to publish carefully researched stories
critical of his local government. During pretrial proceedings, the defendant
officer claimed the arrest was fully constitutional because he had probable
cause to believe that John had been drinking-the bleary eyes and incoher-
ence, he asserts, are hallmarks of an intoxicated driver. The federal judge,
crediting the officer's finding of probable cause, declined to inquire into the
officer's actual reason for arresting John and dismissed the complaint. John
is free, but reluctant to publish his weekly under what he perceives to be the
threat of continued government harassment.
Courts agree that the First Amendment' protects individuals from retalia-
tory action motivated by the exercise of certain constitutional rights. As the
Tenth Circuit recently stated, "'[a]lthough retaliation is not expressly dis-
cussed in the First Amendment, it may be actionable inasmuch as
governmental retaliation tends to chill citizens' exercise of their constitu-
tional rights.' "'
Victims of state or federal retaliatory action may seek redress under sec-
tion 1983 of the Civil Rights Act4 or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Gov-
emnment for a redress of grievances.").
2. See, e.g., Norwell v. City of Cincinnati, 414 U.S. 14 (1973); Evans v. Fogarty, 241 F.
App'x 542 (10th Cir. 2007); Duran v. City of Douglas, 904 F.2d 1372, 1378 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[Alny
action to punish or deter [First-Amendment-protected] speech-such as stopping or hassling the
speaker-is categorically prohibited by the Constitution."); MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., POLICE MIS-
CONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION § 2:28, at 134 (3d ed. 2007) ("Law enforcement activities designed
to retaliate against persons for criticizing government officials, or filing lawsuits against them, vio-
late the First Amendment.").
3. Evans, 241 F. App'x at 550 (quoting Perez v. Ellington 421 F.3d 1128, 1131 (10th Cir.
2005)).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act grants citizens a civil
cause of action for damages against constitutional violations committed by individuals acting in
their capacity as agents of a state. Christopher J. Pettit, The Evolution of Government Liability Un-
der Section 1983, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 145, 146-47 (1992). To the consternation of many jurists and
academics (and no doubt targeted state actors), section 1983 has increasingly become a source of
litigation. E.g., Susanah M. Mead, Evolution of the "Species of Tort Liability" Created by 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983: Can Constitutional Tort Be Saved From Extinction?, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 10-13 (1986).
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of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.' Plaintiffs seeking to recover for allegedly
unconstitutional retaliation must plead and prove (1) the existence of a right
protected by the First Amendment; (2) that the exercise of that right was a
substantial motivating factor in the decision to take the adverse action; and
(3) that the adverse action chilled the exercise of the protected right. 6 Fur-
ther, to prove the prima facie case, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his
exercise of a First-Amendment-protected right was the "but-for" cause of
the adverse action.7 Conduct merely shaded by constitutionally impermissi-
ble motive does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. s
Consequently, a defendant may avoid liability if he can persuade the fact
finder that he would have taken the challenged action notwithstanding any
personal animus engendered by First Amendment conduct.9
A minority of jurists do reject the idea that section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act provides a tort cause of action for intent-based constitutional
torts, but this rejection is limited. Critics of the majority view maintain that
section 1983, as enacted, was meant only to provide a cause of action for
damages against state agents acting pursuant to a duly enacted, but unconsti-
tutional, state statute.'° Notwithstanding their disagreement about the precise
nature of the Civil Rights Act enacted by Congress, these jurists do not ac-
tively seek to abrogate current section 1983 jurisprudence, but instead
support making intent-based constitutional torts more difficult to plead and
prove.
Courts agree less on the proper adjudicatory framework for resolving the
subset of retaliation claims concerned with allegedly unconstitutional ar-
rest." Until recently, federal courts of appeals disagreed as to whether the
5. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens provides individuals the same damages remedy against
federal government agents that is available against agents of the individual states under sec-
tion 1983. See, e.g., Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254 n.2 (2006) ("[Al Bivens action is the
federal analog to suits brought against state officials under... 42 U.S.C. § 1983.").
6. E.g., Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. City of Springboro, 477 F.3d 807, 821 (6th Cir.
2007) (outlining the test applied across circuits in First Amendment retaliation claims).
7. E.g., Hartman, 547 U.S. at 256 ("[W]e have held that retaliation is subject to recovery as
the but-for cause of official action offending the Constitution"); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1977); Cr for Bio-Ethical Reform, 477 F.3d at 823.
8. See Hartman, 547 U.S. at 256.
9. Ctr for Bio-Ethical Reform, 477 F.3d at 823.
10. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 202-59 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(arguing against reading the Civil Rights Act to provide a cause of action against government agents
not acting pursuant to a duly enacted statute).
11. E.g., Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 611-12 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (ex-
pressing displeasure with the current state of section 1983 jurisprudence but advocating the adoption
of a qualified immunity rule that would only make prosecuting such actions more difficult).
12. Arrest is just one form of state action that can give rise to an action for First Amendment
retaliation. The impermissible retaliation can take many forms. See Hartman, 547 U.S. 250 (crimi-
nal prosecution); Crawford-El, 523 U.S. 574 (intentional misdirection of prisoner's personal
effects); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (termination of employment); Mi. Health)', 429
U.S. 274 (same); Williams v. City of Carl Junction, 480 F.3d 871 (8th Cir. 2007) (municipal cita-
tion); Skoog v. County of Clackamas, 469 E3d 1221 (9th Cir. 2006) (search and seizure); Bloch v.
Ribar, 156 F.3d 673 (6th Cir. 1998) (disclosure of sensitive personal information regarding plain-
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presence of probable cause for effectuating the arrest that is the subject of a
13First Amendment retaliation action ought to preclude a plaintiff's recovery.13
The Second and Eleventh Circuits held that as a matter of law a police offi-
cer is not liable for unconstitutional retaliation in an action by an arrestee
where probable cause supported the underlying arrest.' 4 These two circuits
adhere to a "no-probable-cause rule" that places an additional burden on
plaintiffs. 5 Reaching the opposite conclusion, the Sixth Circuit held that the
existence of probable cause does not preclude a plaintiff's constitutional
claim. 6 While the existence of probable cause has probative value in an ac-
tion for retaliatory arrest, the Sixth Circuit reasoned, it by no means
determines the action.
7
A recent decision by the U.S. Supreme Court drastically altered the First
Amendment retaliation landscape and complicated the role that probable
cause plays in the analysis of claims for retaliatory arrest. In its 2006 decision
in Hartman, the Court resolved a different circuit disagreement and made the
absence of probable cause for pressing the underlying charge an element of a
claim for First Amendment retaliatory prosecution." In the eighteen months
since the Court decided Hartman, courts addressing all manner of First
Amendment retaliation actions have relied on Hartman in imposing the no-
probable-cause rule in various, non-prosecution settings. 9 After Hartman the
tiff's rape); Musso v. Hourigan, 836 E2d 736 (2d Cir. 1988) (denial of opportunity to speak at pub-
lic meeting).
13. Baldauf v. Davidson (Baldauf 1), No. 1:04-cv-1571-JDT-TAB, 2007 WL 1202911, at *5-
6 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 23, 2007) (discussing the existence and nature of the disagreement), modified,
2007 WL 2156065 (S.D. Ind. July 24, 2007).
14. See, e.g., Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228 (11 th Cir. 2002); Curley v. Vill. of Suffern, 268
F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2001); Redd v. City of Enterprise, 140 F.3d 1378 (11 th Cir. 1998); Singer v. Fulton
County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 1995); Mozzochi v. Borden, 959 F.2d 1174 (2d Cir. 1992);
Ybarra v. City of Miami, No. 02-20972-C1V, 2003 WL 25564426 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2003).
15. The Supreme Court has adopted this terminology in addressing the issue in the context of
actions alleging retaliatory prosecution. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 258-59.
16. Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889 (6th Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit, while adjudicating a
retaliation claim, asserted that the Tenth Circuit is in agreement with the Sixth Circuit. Skoog, 469
F.3d at 1232 n.31 (citing DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618, 620 (10th Cir. 1990)). However, a re-
view of the case law reveals that the Tenth Circuit's position is less than clear. See DeLoach, 922
F.2d at 620 n.2 ("The firmness of [defendant's] conviction about [plaintiff's] guilt [with regard to
the underlying crime] is not relevant to, and does not justify ... retaliatory action against [plain-
tiff]."), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 814 (1991). Crucially, this Tenth Circuit case does not clearly address
the role that objective probable cause for effectuating the arrest ought to play in the legal calculus.
17. Greene, 310 F.3d at 895, 896-97.
18. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 265-66. Retaliatory-prosecution actions are simply actions
brought to challenge the constitutionality of a prosecutor's decision to file and pursue criminal or
civil charges. Prior to Hartman, actions for retaliatory prosecution were litigated in the same manner
as any other First Amendment retaliation action. See supra text accompanying notes 6-9.
19. Williams v. City of Carl Junction, 480 F.3d 871,876 (8th Cir. 2007) ("We agree... that
the Supreme Court's holding in Hartman is broad enough to apply even where intervening actions
by a prosecutor are not present, and we conclude that the Hartman rule applies in this [action alleg-
ing retaliatory citation]."); Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d 709, 720 (6th Cir. 2006) ("[In its analysis,
Hartman appears to acknowledge that its rule sweeps broadly .... ); Baldauf v. Davidson (Baldauf
1/), No. l:04-cv-1571-JDT-TAB, 2007 WL 2156065 (S.D. Ind. July 24, 2007) (reading Hartman to
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Sixth Circuit determined that its earlier cases rejecting a no-probable-cause
rule in the retaliatory-arrest action were no longer good law.20
Though a clearly defined circuit disagreement no longer exists," the de-
bate continues. Some federal courts of appeals have yet to rule on whether
probable cause precludes an action for retaliatory arrest, and so the debate
continues. Several state and federal district courts in jurisdictions whose
highest court has not yet ruled on the no-probable-cause rule's application to
actions for retaliatory arrest have declined to read Hartman to apply to
situations alleging anything other than retaliatory prosecution, includingactins "22
actions for retaliatory arrest.
This Note considers whether the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Hartman supports a rule that the presence of probable cause for effectuating
an arrest should preclude a First Amendment retaliatory-arrest action and
concludes that it does not. It argues that courts, unconstrained by Hartman,
should decline to adopt the no-probable-cause rule in the arrest context. Part
I analyzes the opinion in Hartman and argues that it does not support a no-
probable-cause rule in the arrest context because its holding is limited to
actions alleging retaliatory prosecution. Part II advocates rejecting the no-
probable-cause rule in the arrest context and argues that the existence of
probable cause does not determine the key issue in an action for retaliatory
arrest: causation. Part II then challenges the thin legal reasoning supporting
the no-probable-cause rule pre-Hartman. It asserts that the Second and
Eleventh Circuits, the rule's early adopters, implemented the rule through
the application of impertinent case law or adherence to questionable prece-
dent and failed to articulate an argument for deviating from the
straightforward application of the claim's elements. Part III asserts that pro-
ponents of the no-probable-cause rule have yet to offer a persuasive policy
argument in favor of imposing the rule in retaliatory-arrest actions.
I. HARTMAN: INAPPLICABLE IN THE ARREST CONTEXT
Part I argues that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Hartman-
requiring plaintiffs in First Amendment retaliatory-prosecution actions to
plead and prove the absence of probable cause for pressing the underlying
charge-does not dictate imposition of the no-probable-cause rule in non-
prosecution contexts. Section L.A describes the Hartman litigation, parses
require plaintiff in a retaliatory-arrest action to plead and prove the lack of probable cause); Hansen
v. Williamson, 440 F. Supp. 2d 663, 676 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
20. See Hansen, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 676 (purporting to recognize the abrogation of the pri-
mary Sixth Circuit case refusing to find the presence of probable cause determinative).
21. The elimination of the circuit disagreement is complete to the extent that the Tenth Cir-
cuit did not clearly hold that the presence of probable cause is not dispositive in an action for
retaliatory arrest. See supra note 16.
22. Skoog v. County of Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221, 1234 (9th Cir. 2006) (reading Hartman
narrowly and refusing to apply its holding in an action for retaliatory search and seizure); Gullick v.
Ott, 517 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1070-72 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (analyzing and refusing to apply Hartman in
an action for retaliatory arrest); Grassilli v. Barr, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 715, 731-33 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)
(same).
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the opinion, and identifies the two necessary considerations on which the
Court's holding depends. Section I.B concludes that because Hartman's
holding is dependent on the presence of an unusual causal gap---arising
where the presence of an intervening actor complicates the link between the
defendant's animus and the allegedly retaliatory action-and because re-
taliatory-arrest actions are not characterized by this gap, Hartman's holding
does not constrain lower courts in adjudicating actions for retaliatory arrest.
A. Hartman Depends on the Presence of Objective Probable
Cause Evidence and the "Causal Gap"
Parsing Hartman is necessary to understanding the contours of its hold-
ing and its possible application in the retaliatory-arrest context. If the
principles underlying Hartman apply in the arrest setting, then the newly
formed circuit consensus is valid. If, however, Hartman's holding does not
translate, courts should look anew at the issue of whether the presence of
probable cause should preclude an action for retaliatory arrest. Section I.A. 1
sets out the circumstance that gave rise to litigation in Hartman, providing
readers with concrete facts that will enable a clearer understanding of re-
taliation actions generally and the Hartman litigation and opinion
specifically. Section I.A.2 argues that Hartman depends on the fact that re-
taliatory-prosecution actions reliably present objective and probative
probable cause evidence that speaks to the issue of causation. Section I.A.3
argues that Hartman's holding further depends on the existence of a causal
gap that renders proving the link between constitutionally protected conduct
and adverse state action more difficult in the retaliatory-prosecution action
than in the normal retaliation action, and makes evidence of the absence of
probable cause practically necessary to prove an impermissible motive.
1. The Facts
Plaintiff William G. Moore, Jr. was the chief executive officer of REI, a
manufacturer of multiline optical character readers for use in interpreting
multiple lines of printed text.23 Moore successfully lobbied against a U.S.
Postal Service plan to adopt a single-line text system that would have
harmed his business, but then ultimately failed to procure a government con-
24tract for which his firm was competing. After losing the contract, Moore
made several public statements critical of the Postal Service.25 A short time
later, federal agents investigated and then charged Moore and several others
in connection with alleged kickbacks and improper conduct in the selection
26
of a new postmaster general. The U.S. District Court for the District of
23. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 252.
24. Id. at 252-53.
25. Id. at 253.
26. Id.
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Columbia eventually dismissed the government's charges after finding a
'complete lack of direct evidence." "
Moore then initiated suit against five postal inspectors alleging that he
was prosecuted in retaliation for his comments critical of the U.S. Postal
Service, comments protected by the First Amendment." The U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia denied the defendant inspectors' motion
for summary judgment and the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia affirmed.2 9 The inspectors subsequently moved for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity, arguing that probable cause supported the
prosecution, but the district court denied the motion and the D.C. Circuit
affirmed.30 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to resolve a circuit
disagreement as to whether probable cause for pressing the underlying
charge should, as a matter of law, defeat the claim for retaliatory prosecu-
tion. ' The sole issue on appeal was whether the existence of probable cause
precludes a claim for retaliatory prosecution.32
2. The Result Depends on the Availability of Objective,
Probative Probable Cause Evidence
The Supreme Court in Hartman found that actions for retaliatory prose-
cution provided an opportunity to impose an objective standard on an intent-
based constitutional tort that is otherwise difficult to adjudicate. Because
First Amendment retaliation actions center on the defendant's subjective
intent,33 these claims, including those for retaliatory prosecution, present
real adjudicatory difficulties. 34 Defending against and adjudicating an action
for First Amendment retaliation is problematic because retaliatory motive is
"'easy to allege and hard to disprove.' 33 An arrestee can, with little diffi-
culty, file a complaint alleging that his arrest was the result of unconstitutional
retaliation. A defendant officer can do little to prove definitively that he effec-
tuated the arrest for permissible reasons, and a successful defense of the
action depends largely on whether the fact finder believes the officer's ver-
sion of the arrest over the plaintiff's. The defendant investigators in
27. Id. at 254 (quoting United States v. Recognition Equip. Inc., 725 F. Supp. 587, 596
(D.D.C. 1989)).
28. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 254.
29. Moore v. United States, 213 F3d 705 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
30. Moore v. Hartman, 388 F.3d 871 (D.C. Cir. 2004), rev'd, 547 U.S. 250.
31. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 255-56.
32. Id. at 256-57.
33. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
34. Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 682 (6th Cir. 1998) ("'[Cliaims involving proof of a [de-
fendant's] intent seldom lend themselves to summary disposition.' ") (alteration in original) (quoting
Curtis v. Story, No. 87-5988, 1988 WL 125361, at *3 (6th Cir. Nov. 25, 1988)).
35. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 585 (1998) (quoting Crawford-El v. Britton, 93
F.3d 813, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc)).
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Hartman invoked these difficulties to support their request for the protection
16
of a no-probable-cause rule.
The action for retaliatory prosecution is different. Unlike many other ac-
tions alleging First Amendment retaliation," actions for retaliatory
prosecution are consistently characterized by a dispute over one central fact:
the presence or absence of probable cause for pressing the underlying
charge. The Court recognized that "the significance of probable cause or the
lack of it looms large, being a potential feature of every case, with obvious
evidentiary value. 38 This probable cause evidence is objective and speaks
directly to the issue of whether or not the prosecution of the underlying
charge was the result of unconstitutional retaliation. 39
The Supreme Court justified its adoption of the objective no-probable-
cause rule in part by arguing that lower courts could implement a rule mak-
ing special use of probable cause evidence in the retaliatory-prosecution
context with relative ease. Valuable probable cause evidence is always avail-
able40 and "[t]he issue rof probable cause] is ... likely to be raised by some
party at some point"4' in the retaliatory-prosecution context. Where the par-
ties to the litigation will already have access to the evidence, and are likely
already planning on devoting time and resources to disputing that evidence,
courts can implement the rule without increasing the burden on either the
42litigants or the courts.
3. The Result Depends on the "Causal Gap" that Makes
Proving Lack of Probable Cause Necessary
Actions for retaliatory prosecution are characterized by a causal gap
that makes demonstrating the link between the defendant's animus and the
alleged retaliation unusually complicated, and makes the presence of evi-
dence that can bridge this gap all but necessary to prove retaliation. In the
36. See Hartman, 547 U.S. at 257 ("The [defendant] inspectors argue [that a] plaintiff can
afflict a public officer with disruption and expense by alleging nothing more, in practical terms, than
action with a retaliatory animus, a subjective condition too easy to claim and too hard to defend
against.").
37. In, for instance, an action for retaliatory termination of employment, there is no objective
standard outlining the instances in which termination is appropriate. Id. at 258.
38. Id. at 265.
39. Proving the absence of probable cause for pressing the underlying claim does much to
help the plaintiff prove that his exercise of First Amendment rights was the but-for cause of his
prosecution. See Gullick v. Ott, 517 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1070 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (highlighting the
probative value of probable cause evidence in assessing whether adverse state action was the result
of unconstitutional retaliation).
40. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 261 ("[In the prosecution context] there will always be a distinct
body of highly valuable circumstantial evidence available and apt to prove or disprove retaliatory
causation, namely evidence showing whether there was or was not probable cause to bring the
criminal charge.").
41. Id. at 265.
42. Id. ("Our sense is that the very significance of probable cause means that a requirement
to plead and prove its absence will usually be cost free by any incremental reckoning.").
October 2008]
Michigan Law Review
normal action alleging unconstitutional retaliation, a plaintiff makes the
straightforward claim that an individual government officer undertook
some adverse action as a result of personal animus engendered by the
plaintiff's exercise of First Amendment rights.4 ' The plaintiff can usually
prove the link between the actor's animus and the retaliatory action with
little complication."
In the action for retaliatory prosecution, however, the link between ani-
mus and retaliatory action is more complex.45 Because a prosecutor enjoys
46
absolute immunity from suit related to prosecutorial decisions, the plaintiff
in a retaliatory-prosecution suit must normally sue investigators, police offi-4 17
cers, or other government officials involved in the broader prosecution.
Consequently, plaintiffs must not only demonstrate animus on the part of the
defendant officer or investigator but also that the defendant successfully
induced the presumptively disinterested prosecutor to press charges that he
would not otherwise have pressed.48 A disconnect then exists-termed the
"causal gap"-between the alleged animus of the defendant(s) and the ad-
verse action.49
This break in the chain of causation makes the already valuable evidence
of a lack of probable cause uniquely necessary and provides the ultimate
rationale for the Court's adoption of the no-probable-cause rule in Hartman.
The Court unambiguously stated that "[i]t is, instead, the need to prove a
chain of causation from animus to injury, with details specific to retaliatory-
prosecution cases, that provides the strongest justification for the no-
probable-cause requirement.' The causal gap makes it practically neces-
sary to show that no probable cause existed in order to rebut the strong
presumption that the intervening prosecutor acted independently and with-
out unconstitutional bias. As the court explained, "[s]ome sort of allegation,
then, is needed both to bridge the gap between the nonprosecuting govern-
ment agent's motive and the prosecutor's action, and to address the
presumption of prosecutorial regularity."'" Absent a showing that no prob-
43. Id.
44. See id. at 261. This is not to say, however, that persuading a fact finder that the desire to
retaliate was the but-for cause of the adverse action is easy.
45. Id. at 259 ("[T]he need to demonstrate causation in the retaliatory-prosecution context
presents an additional difficulty that can be understood by comparing the requisite causation in
ordinary retaliation claims ... with causation in [retaliatory-prosecution claims].").
46. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976).
47. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 261-62 ("[An] action for retaliatory prosecution will not be
brought against the prosecutor, who is absolutely immune from liability for the decision to prose-
cute. Instead the defendant will be a nonprosecutor, an official, like an inspector .... ") (citation
omitted).
48. Id. at 262. The Ninth Circuit, relying on language from Hartman, has noted that a retalia-
tory-prosecution action is "really 'for successful retaliatory inducement to prosecute.'" Skoog v.
County of Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221, 1234 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hartman, 547 U.S. at 262).
49. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 264.
50. Id. at 259.
51. Id. at 263.
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able cause existed for pressing the underlying charge, in the Court's opinion,
the presence of an intervening, presumptively disinterested, prosecutor is
enough to defeat the claim.5" If, however, the plaintiff can bridge the causal
gap by demonstrating the absence of probable cause, he will give "the claim
of retaliation ... some vitality '53 and sufficiently justify the adjudication of
his tort action.
B. Hartman Does Not Control Because the "Causal Gap"
Does Not Characterize the Arrest Action
Hartman does not control in the retaliatory-arrest context because of the
two necessary considerations upon which the Hartman holding depends;
54
only the centrality and availability of objective, probative probable cause
evidence characterizes the action for retaliatory arrest.55 The Supreme Court
explicitly stated that absent the causal gap found in the action for retaliatory
prosecution, the adoption of the no-probable-cause rule would have been
inappropriate: "[the centrality and availability of objective probable cause
evidence] alone does not mean, of course, that a ... plaintiff should be re-
quired to plead and prove no probable cause. 56 In the normal action for
retaliatory arrest there is no causal gap: the plaintiff alleges that the animus
of one identified defendant police officer caused that officer to arrest him
57
when he otherwise would not have done so.
Evidence of a lack of probable cause is relevant, but insufficient to war-
rant application of a no-probable-cause rule. True, a demonstrable absence
of probable cause in the arrest context strongly suggests the presence of an
unconstitutional motive, and undoubtedly strengthens the plaintiff's claim.
Conceding the point, a federal district court in Wisconsin recently observed
that "the absence of probable cause is strong evidence that the officer's true
52. See id. ("[This presumption that a prosecutor has legitimate grounds for the action he
takes is one we do not lightly discard, given our position that judicial intrusion into executive discre-
tion of such high order should be minimal.").
53. Id. at 265.
54. See supra Sections I.A.2-3.
55. Gullick v. Ott, 517 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1072 (W.D. Wis. 2007) ("[Ilf an officer had prob-
able cause for making an arrest, that tends to undermine an allegation that the arrest was fabricated,
just as the absence of probable cause is strong evidence that the officer's true motive for the arrest
was an illegal one.").
56. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 261; see Gullick, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 ("The Court [in
Hartman] saw [the causal gap] as dispositive... ).
57. Gullick, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 1071 ("[C]oncems raised by ... a 'more complex' chain of
causation ... are not implicated when no prosecutor is involved in the claim and when the named
defendant is directly responsible for the plaintiff's alleged injuries, as in this case [for retaliatory
arrest]."); Baldauf v. Davidson (Baldauf 11), No. 1:04-cv- 1571 -JDT-TAB, 2007 WL 2156065, at *2
(S.D. Ind. July 24, 2007) ("At first glance, no such complex causation problems are present when a
person brings a retaliatory arrest claim that focuses entirely on an officer's bodily seizure of a plain-
tiff through the power of arrest."); cf Skoog v. County of Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221, 1234 (9th Cir.
2006) (holding that the seizure of certain personal effects in retaliation for the exercise of First
Amendment rights did not involve "multi-layered causation").
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motive for the arrest was an illegal one."" But as the same court ultimately
held, absent a causal gap that requires bridging, proving the absence of
probable cause is not necessary, and, by Hartman's reasoning, a rule man-
dating that plaintiffs prove its absence is unjustified. 9
Some courts have focused on dicta in Hartman to suggest that its hold-
ing sweeps broadly, applying in actions in which no gap renders the
probable cause evidence all but necessary, but courts should reject this ar-
gument. The Sixth Circuit has argued that "Hartman appears to
acknowledge that its rule sweeps broadly."w In Hartman, the Supreme Court
did concede that not all actions for retaliatory prosecution present compli-
cated causation issues, admitting that "the requisite causation is usually
more complex than it is in other retaliation cases., 6' Accordingly, the Court
appeared to accept that its no-probable-cause rule would unfairly burden
plaintiffs in some actions in which proving the absence of probable cause
was not necessary to bridge the causal gap.62 The Court appeared willing to
accept that "its holding ... would come at a cost ' 63 and that in some excep-
tional retaliatory-prosecution actions where the intervening prosecutor was
himself not disinterested-either because he had his own animus or was
sufficiently influenced by the defendants-plaintiffs would be unnecessarily
burdened. 64
Courts should not read this language to apply Hartman broadly. The
Court, however, clearly noted that these exceptional actions would be "rare
and consequently poor guides in structuring [the] cause of action."65 To sug-
58. Gullick, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 1072.
59. Id. at 1070-71 (refusing to require a plaintiff in an action for retaliatory arrest to plead
and prove the absence of probable cause). The Sixth Circuit has missed Hartman's reliance on the
causal gap. See Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d 709, 719 (6th Cir. 2006) ("The [Hartman] Court offered
two main rationales for its holding: the issue of probable cause will likely be relevant in any retalia-
tory-prosecution case and the requisite causation between the defendant's retaliatory animus and the
plaintiff's injury is usually more complex than it is in other retaliation cases." (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Unfortunately, this bifurcation of Hartman has been ratified by
several other federal district courts. Baldauf 1l, 2007 WL 2156065 at *3 ("In Barnes, the Sixth Cir-
cuit noted that the Supreme Court offered two reasons for embracing a no-probable-cause
requirement .... [T]his court finds the Sixth Circuit's reasoning persuasive for several reasons.");
Williams v. City of Carl Junction, 480 F.3d 871, 876 (8th Cir. 2007) ("We agree with the Sixth Cir-
cuit that the Supreme Court's holding in Hartman is broad enough to apply even where intervening
actions by a prosecutor are not present, and we conclude that the Hartman rule applies in this [ac-
tion for retaliatory citation]."). But see Gullick, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 1072 ("But Barnes is not
persuasive because the court stated only that the Hartman rule 'sweeps broadly' without explaining
why.").
60. Barnes, 449 F.3d at 720; see also Baldauf ll, 2007 WL 2156065 at *3 (approving of the
Barnes analysis); Williams, 480 F.3d at 876 (same).
61. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 261 (emphasis added).
62. Baldauf 11, 2007 WL 2156065 at *4.
63. Id.
64. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 264 ("A prosecutor's disclosure of retaliatory thinking on his part,
for example, would be of great significance in addressing the presumption and closing the gap. So
would evidence that a prosecutor was nothing but a rubber stamp for his investigative staff or the
police.").
65. Id.
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gest, then, that this language justifies the imposition of the no-probable-
cause rule in a class of actions in which the overwhelming majority of plain-
tiffs would be burdened without the practical necessity engendered by the
causal gap perverts this judicial compromise.6
H. No PERSUASIVE LEGAL ARGUMENT EXISTS FOR IMPOSING THE
NO-PROBABLE-CAUSE RULE IN ARREST ACTIONS
This Part argues that the presence of probable cause is not determinative
in retaliatory-arrest actions and that pre-Hartman courts applying the no-
probable-cause rule did so without providing precedential support or a
novel, compelling legal rationale for their holdings. Section II.A argues that
the presence of probable cause in the retaliatory-arrest context does nothing
more than provide one possible permissible justification for undertaking the
challenged arrest. Section II.A then asserts that the application of an estab-
lished constitutional principle-that an act taken in retaliation for the
exercise of First Amendment rights is actionable even if the act would have
been proper when taken for a different reason--demonstrates that the pres-
ence of probable cause does not determine, as a matter of law, the causation
issue in a retaliatory-arrest action. Section II.B identifies the seminal no-
probable-cause rule cases in the Eleventh and Second Circuits-the two
federal courts of appeals that applied the rule pre-Hartman-and argues that
courts should reject them for relying on impertinent case law and failing to
articulate novel, compelling legal grounds on which to base their holdings.
A. The Presence of Probable Cause Does Not Prevent Plaintiffs
from Proving the Causation Element
The presence of probable cause does not determine the action for retalia-
tory arrest because it simply provides one possible justification for the
challenged arrest, and under established Supreme Court precedent, the pres-
ence of an alternate, non-retaliatory justification for the challenged action
does not, as a matter of law, defeat a retaliation claim. A First Amendment
challenge to an arrest, unlike, for instance, a Fourth Amendment" challenge,
does not rest on an allegation that the arrest was unsupported by probable
66. Nearly any arrest can, with little effort, meet the "relatively low standard" that it be sup-
ported by probable cause. Sadiq Reza, Privacy and the Criminal Arrestee or Suspect: In Search of a
Right, in Need of a Rule, 64 MD. L. REv. 755, 796-97 (2005) (noting that the probable cause stan-
dard is easy to satisfy while arguing that a requirement that the identity of an arrestee be protected
until a judge has determined that probable cause exists would protect important constitutional
rights).
67. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause... ").
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cause. 68 The First Amendment guarantees freedom from interference with,
inter alia, speech, assembly, and religious rights.
In the arrest context, then, the First Amendment does not proscribe ar-
rests unsupported by probable cause, but prevents the government from• 70
stifling rights in a way that it could not through legislation or regulation.
The First Amendment thus concerns itself with impermissible intent in an
effort to prevent the government from achieving a kind of constitutional end
around that would allow it to circumvent the First Amendment's restric-
tions.7' So if the arresting officer's desire to retaliate was the actual cause of
the arrest, the arrest will be actionable under the First Amendment.72 The
presence of probable cause does not conclusively determine actual intent-it
provides but one possible explanation for the occurrence of the arrest. Con-
sequently, a plaintiff in a retaliation challenge to an arrest can logically
maintain that his arrest was the actual result of impermissible retaliation
even where the arrest was supported by judicially validated probable cause.
Under established Supreme Court precedent, in an action for retaliatory
arrest, the existence of one possible permissible justification for an allegedly
retaliatory arrest does not, as a matter of law, render it impossible to prove
that the arrest was, in fact, unconstitutional. In the First Amendment retalia-
tion context, the Supreme Court has held that state action taken for a
constitutionally impermissible reason is actionable even if it would have
been proper when taken for a different, fully legal reason:
[We have] made clear that even though a person has no "right" to a valu-
able governmental benefit and even though the government may deny him
the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which
68. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures,
including arrests, which are merely bodily seizures. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980)
("The simple language of the [Fourth] Amendment applies equally to seizures of persons and to
seizures of property."). Where probable cause to arrest exists, an officer is constitutionally empow-
ered to make an arrest that is not otherwise illegal. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318,
354 (2001) ("There is no dispute that [defendant] had probable cause to believe that [plaintiff] had
committed a crime .... [Defendant] was accordingly authorized (not required, but authorized) to
make a custodial arrest without balancing costs and benefits or determining whether or not [plain-
tiff's] arrest was in some sense necessary."). A Fourth Amendment challenge to an arrest asserts that
the arrest was unsupported by the constitutionally required probable cause, and is unconcerned with
retaliatory motive. E.g., Joseph v. Rowlen, 402 F.2d 367, 370 (7th Cir. 1968); see also Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) ("We think [our] cases foreclose any argument that the
constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual
officers involved.... Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amend-
ment analysis."). A Fourth Amendment challenge thus cannot succeed where the arresting officer
had probable cause for effectuating the arrest. E.g., Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110,
118-19 (2d Cir. 1995) ("There can be no federal civil rights claim for false arrest where the arresting
officer had probable cause.").
69. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
70. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) ("[First Amendment retaliation]
allow[s] the government to 'produce a result which [it] could not command directly.' ") (third altera-
tion in original) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
71. E.g. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 612 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (character-
izing retaliation actions as "intent-based" constitutional torts).
72. See cases cited supra note 7.
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the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a ba-
sis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests--especially, his
interest in freedom of speech.73
The federal courts of appeals have fully embraced this holding in their First
Amendment retaliation jurisprudence.74 The Sixth Circuit expressed this
general acceptance when it held that "[t]he law is well established that '[a]n
act taken in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutionally protected right is
actionable under § 1983 even if the act, when taken for a different reason,
would have been proper.' "
Importantly, the Supreme Court has not retreated from this holding: its
imposition of the no-probable-cause rule notwithstanding, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed this holding in Hartman." In the arrest context, then, the fact that a
defendant officer had valid grounds for arresting a plaintiff, independent of any
impermissible speech-related animus, does not mean that the officer did not
arrest for an unconstitutional retaliatory reason." Consequently, the existence of
probable cause for effectuating the underlying arrest should not, as a matter of
law, negate the causation element of the claim." Crucially, the presence of
probable cause does not mean that retaliatory motive was not the "but-for"
cause of the arrest. Though the presence or absence of probable cause speaks
73. Perry, 408 U.S. at 597.
74. Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 895 (6th Cir. 2002); DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618,
620 (10th Cir. 1990); Losch v. Borough of Parkesburg, 736 F2d 903, 907-08 (3d Cir. 1984); Buise
v. Hudkins, 584 F.2d 223, 230 (7th Cir. 1978) (citing and applying Perry in a First Amendment
retaliation action).
75. Greene, 310 F.3d at 895 (second alteration in original) (quoting Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d
673, 681-82 (6th Cir. 1998)).
76. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006) ("Some official actions adverse to such a
speaker might well be unexceptionable if taken on other grounds, but when nonretaliatory grounds
are in fact insufficient to provoke the adverse consequences, we have held that retaliation is subject
to recovery as the but-for cause of official action....").
77. Greene, 310 F.3d at 895 ("[H]owever, the existence of probable cause is not determina-
tive of the constitutional question if, as alleged here, the plaintiff was arrested in retaliation for his
having engaged in constitutionally protected speech."); Gullick v. Ott, 517 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1069
(W.D. Wis. 2007). Because of the unique and awesome powers possessed by police officers, this
rule might have even more valuable in the arrest context than in other retaliation contexts. Id.
("[Tihe consequences of [rejecting the doctrine] are troubling because it would permit unethical
officers to target their enemies or critics with a litany of citations for petty violations that would be
ignored if committed by anyone else.").
78. See supra note 16.
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directly to the defendant officer's motivation in arresting the plaintiff,79 it
should not ultimately determine the issue of causation."
B. Cases Applying the No-Probable-Cause Rule
Pre-Hartman Are Unpersuasive
The federal courts of appeals cases applying the no-probable-cause rule
before the Supreme Court's decision in Hartman were wrongly decided.
Courts should reject the Eleventh Circuit's adoption of the no-probable-
cause rule because it relied on a decision that did not address a claim for
retaliation, and consequently did not address the issue of impermissible in-
tent that is central to all retaliation actions. In Redd v. City of Enterprise, the
Eleventh Circuit granted summary judgment in favor of defendant police
officers based on qualified immunity in an action alleging First Amendment
retaliatory arrest.8' It held that the officers, in arresting protestors with prob-
able cause to believe they were in violation of a local disorderly conduct
statute, did not violate plaintiffs' clearly established First Amendment
rights."
For the proposition that the officers did not violate any established
speech rights, the Redd court relied on Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,s3 but
Zurcher did not involve the issue central to retaliation actions: retaliatory
animus. In Zurcher, police officers executed a warrant at the offices of the
Stanford University newspaper seeking to obtain photographs and other
documentary evidence that the officers believed would help them identify
79. Though there is no indication that police officers always or even often arrest individuals
who have given them probable cause to do so, one can assume that probable cause tends to support
an officer's assertion that he arrested for constitutionally benign reasons. The Gullick court agreed
with this proposition:
This is not to say that the existence or absence of probable cause is an unimportant fact to con-
sider in an assessment [of] whether an arrest .. . was conducted for retaliatory reasons .... [Ilf
an officer had probable cause for making an arrest, that tends to undermine an allegation that
the arrest was fabricated.
Gullick, 517 F Supp. 2d at 1072.
80. Id. ("[The presence of probable cause] does not change the ultimate question, which is
whether the defendant would have taken the same act in the absence of the plaintiff's protected
conduct.").
81. 140 F.3d 1378, 1384 (11 th Cir. 1998). Importantly, Redd is not an isolated incidence of
judicial folly, but is the seminal Eleventh Circuit no-probable-cause rule case and has been cited by
several courts for the proposition that the existence of probable cause precludes an action for retalia-
tory arrest. Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11 th Cir. 2002); Ybarra v. City of Miami, No. 02-
20972-CIV, 2003 WL 25564426, at *19 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2003).
82. Redd, 140 F.3d at 1383-84. Granting "qualified immunity" is perhaps error on the
court's part. Since it held that no constitutional right was violated, the court did not actually grant
qualified immunity, a device used to protect state actors who through reasonable mistake violate
protected rights. This mistake is not uncommon, and the Supreme Court has been careful to remind
lower courts not to confuse the pleading requirements in a retaliation action with the separate
(though closely related) issue of qualified immunity. See Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588-
89 (1998).
83. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
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individuals who they suspected had violated laws during a protest. 4 Several
students at the newspaper filed suit under § 1983 s" alleging violation of their
First and Fourth Amendment rights." The students challenged the execution
of the warrant, arguing that only a subpoena duces tecums7 could properly
ensure the protection of vital First Amendment rights when the government
wished to execute a search warrant." Crucially, the Zurcher plaintiffs made
no allegation that the defendant officers sought or executed the warrant in an
effort to punish the newspaper or its employees for the exercise of protected
rights.
Without such an allegation of unconstitutional motive, one simply can-
not read Zurcher to support the imposition of the no-probable-cause rule in
retaliatory-arrest actions. Improper motivation is the defining characteristic
of an action for retaliatory arrest and one cannot ignore this in adjudicating
the dispute.89 In this setting, holding that a properly motivated search sup-
ported by probable cause does not violate First Amendment rights is both
uncontroversial and wholly silent on the crucial issues in a retaliatory-arrest
action. Readers of Redd and its progeny should demand more before credit-
ing the Eleventh Circuit's application of the no-probable-cause rule.
Courts should also reject the Second Circuit's pre-Hartman rule holding
that the existence of probable cause precludes an action for retaliatory ar-
rest. The seminal case, Mozzochi v. Borden,90 has two significant
weaknesses. First, the Mozzochi court summarily refused to inquire into the
defendant officer's motivation for arresting the plaintiff in an action for re-
taliatory arrest. Mozzochi held that "because there was probable cause in
this case to believe that [plaintiff] violated the harassment statute, we will
not examine the defendants' motives in reporting [plaintiff's] actions to the
police for prosecution."9' Courts should question Mozzochi's refusal, without
providing any justification, to consider the defendant's intent in an intent-
based constitutional tort.92
84. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 550-51.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
86. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 552.
87. See generally 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 21 (2007). A subpoena duces tecum is a subpoena
"used to procure the production of books and records." Id.
88. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 560.
89. See supra note 71 and accompanying text; see also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574,
588 (1998) ("It is equally clear that an essential element of some constitutional claims is a charge
that the defendant's conduct was improperly motivated."); Gullick v. Ott, 517 F. Supp. 2d 1063,
1069 (W.D. Wis. 2007) ("[T]he [Seventh Circuit] court of appeals has made it clear that motive
matters.").
90. 959 F.2d 1174 (2d Cir. 1992). In two separate opinions the Second Circuit relied on
Mozzochi in imposing some variation of the no-probable-cause rule in adjudicating retaliatory-arrest
claims. Curley v. Vill. of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2001); Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63
F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 1995).
91. Mozzochi, 959 F.2d at 1179-80.
92. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing why motive matters).
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Second, a subsequent Second Circuit decision seriously undermined
Mozzochi's central holding. In Blue v. Koren, the Second Circuit called
Mozzochi into doubt for its suggestion that plaintiffs cannot maintain retalia-
tory-arrest actions where the underlying arrest is supported by probable
cause: "Mozzochi [is] troubling in that [it] appear[s] to negate the existence
of a retaliation claim involving arrests. If probable cause provides qualified
immunity from a retaliation claim, then such a claim can be asserted only in
cases in which a false arrest claim can also be made." 93 Courts adjudicating
retaliatory-arrest claims should not rely on this weakened opinion.
III. PROPONENTS HAVE NOT ARTICULATED A PERSUASIVE POLICY
RATIONALE FOR APPLYING THE RULE IN ARREST ACTIONS
Neither existing legal doctrine 4 nor controlling precedent95 recommend
imposing the no-probable-cause rule in actions for retaliatory arrest, and no
court or scholar has yet articulated a sufficiently persuasive policy argument
in favor of applying the rule to retaliatory-arrest claims.96 This Part argues
that, though intent-based constitutional torts present adjudicatory difficul-
ties,97 proponents of the no-probable-cause rule currently overstate the
worries underlying their principle arguments for the imposition of the rule.
Section III.A argues that the litigation statistics demonstrate that the volume
of retaliatory-arrest actions is relatively unremarkable, and should mute
concerns over a need to reduce the number of such actions by making the
claim more difficult to plead and prove. Section III.A further argues that the
current volume of retaliatory-arrest litigation will not impair the quality of
policing because officers can work free from worries about being haled into
court knowing that judges can enter summary judgment based on qualified
immunity to protect well-meaning defendants from the burdens of pro-
tracted litigation. Section II1.B argues that courts and government agents
need not fear a surge in retaliatory-arrest actions once courts fully reject the
no-probable-cause rule in the arrest context, emphasizing the role that quali-
fied immunity can play in protecting officers from spurious allegations and
freeing dockets of frivolous litigation.
93. Blue v. Koren, 72 F.3d 1075, 1083 n.5 (2d Cir. 1995). The court went on to suggest an
alternate, less troubling, justification for the troubling holding: a similarly troubling case "stressed
the lack of particularized evidence of a retaliatory motive in finding that qualified immunity existed.
There was a similar lack of evidence in Mozzochi, where the arrest was in response to a threatening
communication." Id.
94. See supra Part I.
95. See supra Part I.
96. Some jurists assert that intent-based torts should not be actionable under the Civil Rights
Act. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. This argument, though perhaps correct as a
historical matter or as a matter of statutory interpretation, raises issues outside the scope of this
Note.
97. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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A. Courts Can Manage Arrest Actions Without Making the
Claim More Difficult to Plead and Prove
Retaliatory-arrest actions are not so prevalent or difficult to adjudicate
that they unduly burden the nation's courts and inhibit defendant officers'
ability to effectively police. Proponents of the no-probable-cause rule have
urged courts to make intent-based constitutional torts more difficult to plead
and prove because the actions are clogging courts' dockets and unduly bur-
dening defendant government agents, impairing their ability to effectively
police.9"
The litigation statistics, however, do not reveal a volume of retaliatory-
arrest actions worthy of concern. In the last quarter-century, litigants have
squarely presented only twenty-nine actions for retaliatory arrest to federal
courts of appeals.99 The Supreme Court, arguing in Hartman that the number
of retaliatory-prosecution actions was wholly reasonable and not unduly
burdening government defendants or adjudicating courts, used an identical
metric and identified a similar incidence of such actions.'0° The Court found
that the number of retaliatory-prosecution claims was insufficient cause for
concern and argued that there is not "much leverage in the fear that without
a filter to screen out claims [defendant] federal prosecutors and federal
courts will be unduly put upon by the volume of litigation."'0 '
Judges can control the courts' dockets and protect government agents
from those retaliatory-arrest claims that are filed by utilizing several proce-
dural tools, including summary judgment based on qualified immunity. As
the Supreme Court argued in Crawford-El, trial courts adjudicating intent-
based constitutional torts can lessen the litigation burden on defendants by
employing several procedural tools: courts can require plaintiffs to provide
sufficiently particularized pleadings, aggressively manage discovery, and
use summary judgment "as the ultimate screen to weed out truly insubstan-
tial lawsuits."'
0 2
98. E.g., Baldauf v. Davidson (Baldauf fl), No. l:04-cv-1571-JDT-TAB, 2007 WL 2156065,
at *4 (S.D. Ind. July 24, 2007); see Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 259 (2006) (rejecting plain-
tiffs' policy arguments).
99. This number was ascertained by performing the following search on Westlaw's "CTA"
database: "retaliat!" Is "first amendment" /s "arrest." The search covered the twenty-five years from
1982 to 2007. As of October 10, 2007, a total of sixty-two cases appear, but in only twenty-nine
were the merits of a claim for retaliatory arrest actually at issue on appeal.
100. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 258-59 ("Over the past 25 years fewer than two dozen damages
actions for retaliatory prosecution ... have come squarely before the Federal Courts of
Appeals....").
101. Id. at 258.
102. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 (1998); see id. at 597-602 (discussing why
courts are capable of managing the difficulties associated with intent-based constitutional torts).
Two federal district courts recently proved capable of handling intent-based constitutional torts in
the manner the Supreme Court suggested. See Lyman v. City of Albany, No. 1:06-CV-1 109
(LEK/DRH), 2008 WL 563378, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. March 3, 2008) ("Plaintiff's claim of retaliation
does not rise above the purely speculative level required to survive Defendants' Motion to dis-
miss."); Eno Farms Coop. Ass'n v. Corp. for Indep. Living, No. 3:06cvI983(AHN), 2007 WL
3308016, at *10 (D. Conn. Nov. 5, 2007) ("[Blecause the causal link supporting [the] claim is not
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Most importantly, courts can be aggressive in entering summary judg-
ment based on qualified immunity to protect well-meaning defendant
officers from harassing litigation and help courts to avoid the prospect of
resource-sapping trials. Qualified immunity protects a defendant govern-
ment agent from liability "if he or she could have reasonably believed his or
her conduct to be lawful 'in light of clearly established law and the informa-
tion [that the defendant] possessed.' ,,03 Qualified immunity is so defendant-
friendly that the Eighth Circuit has observed that "[t]he qualified immunity
standard gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."' 1°4 Conse-
quently, well-meaning officers who do not "knowingly violate the law" can
effectively execute their duties without fearing that they are one arrest away
from facing debilitating litigation. Perhaps most importantly for those who
worry that a claim for retaliatory arrest is a validated ticket to trial, courts
decide the issue of qualified immunity pretrial as a matter of law "because
'[t]he entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to li-
ability.' ,,5
B. Courts Should Not Fear a Surge in Retaliatory-Arrest Actions
In light of the central characteristics of the First Amendment retaliation
action and the protections offered by qualified immunity, proponents of the
no-probable-cause rule should not worry that, once the rule is fully and pub-
licly rejected, arrestees will refashion non-First Amendment challenges as
First Amendment challenges, causing a surge in retaliatory-arrest actions. A
federal district court in Indiana, in imposing the no-probable-cause rule,
articulated the fear that enterprising plaintiffs would transform constitu-
self-evident, [and] the plaintiffs have an obligation [which they have not fulfilled] to amplify the
claim with factual allegations rendering it plausible . . . the first amended complaint fails to state a
claim of First Amendment retaliation.").
103. Smithson v. Aldrich, 235 F.3d 1058, 1061 (8th Cir. 2000) (alteration in original) (quoting
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987)). See generally Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982) ("[Glovemment officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded
from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."). It is important to note
that qualified immunity analysis presupposes that a constitutional violation has occurred. See Dahl
v. Holley, 312 E3d 1228, 1233 (11 th Cir. 2002) ("In considering whether the officers are entitled to
qualified immunity on [plaintiff's] § 1983 claims, we must first determine whether the facts ...
establish a constitutional violation."); Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 678 (6th Cir. 1998) ("Before we
can consider whether [defendant] is entitled to qualified immunity ... we must first examine
whether the [plaintiffs] have properly alleged a cause of action.").
104. Smithson, 235 F.3d at 1061 (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (per
curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
105. Hunter, 502 U.S. at 227 (alteration in original) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472, U.S.
511, 526 (1985)); see also id. ("[W]e repeatedly have stressed the importance of resolving immunity
questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation."); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 ("On summary
judgment, the judge appropriately may determine, not only the currently applicable law, but whether
that law was clearly established at the time an action occurred.... Until this threshold immunity
question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed." (footnote omitted)).
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tional challenges to arrests that are defeated by probable cause '°6 into First
Amendment challenges in the face of more plaintiff-friendly claim ele-
ments: "[failing to adopt the rule] would allow numerous plaintiffs to bring
Fourth Amendment claims that would otherwise be dismissed by relabeling
them as First Amendment retaliation claims."'' 7
This argument overlooks the fact that not all arrests that plaintiffs might
challenge implicate First Amendment concerns. '°s As part of a claim for re-
taliatory arrest, a plaintiff must allege the exercise of a protected right and
the centrality of that right in the decision to arrest.' °9 The Supreme Court has
made clear that "[w]hen intent is an element of a constitutional violation...
the primary focus is not on any possible animus directed at the plaintiff;
rather, it is more specific, such as ... to deter public comment on a specific
issue of public importance."" Although plaintiffs are free in practice to
plead facts not in existence, a plaintiff's ability to fabricate does not warrant
changing the elements of an established constitutional tort."'
Because the extent to which the plaintiff's conduct is clearly protected
by the First Amendment is central to determining the reasonableness of the
defendant's conduct, defendant officers are adequately protected from the
creative pleading of plaintiffs seeking to apply the retaliatory-arrest claim
elements to arrests that do not implicate First Amendment concerns. For a
government agent to be held liable for violating an individual's constitu-
tional rights, the Supreme Court has held that "[tihe contours of the right
must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that
what he is doing violates that right."" 
2
Plaintiffs disingenuously pleading that their arrests implicated First
Amendment concerns would have trouble meeting this standard because
they would have to creatively redefine unprotected conduct to bring it within
106. A Fourth Amendment challenge to an arrest is one such action that is defeated by the
presence of probable cause. See supra note 68.
107. Baldauf v. Davidson, No. 1:04-cv-1571-JDT-TAB, 2007 WL 2156065, at *4 (S.D. Ind.
July 24, 2007); see also Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 604-05 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Rehnquist
argued:
Such a rule would also allow plaintiffs to strip defendants of [qualified immunity] protections
by a simple act of pleading-any minimally competent attorney (or pro se litigant) can convert
any adverse decision into a motive-based tort, and thereby subject government officials to
some measure of intrusion into their subjective worlds.
Id. at 605.
108. Some arrests, for instance, implicate only the individual's interest in being free from
unreasonable search and seizure. See supra note 68.
109. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
110. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 592; see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
111. Ideally, disciplinary consequences, such as sanctions available under Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would sufficiently deter the filing of spurious claims. FED. R. Civ.
P. 11; see also CTC Imps. & Exps. v. Nigerian Petroleum Corp., 739 F Supp. 966, 969 (E.D. Pa.
1990) ("The purpose of Rule II ... is to discourage pleadings which are frivolous, legally unrea-
sonable, or without factual foundation.").
112. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); see also Dickerson v. McClellan, 101
F.3d 1151, 1158 (6th Cir. 1996).
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the protection of the First Amendment. Consequently, even if a court were to
ultimately find the plaintiff's creatively defined right was protected by the
First Amendment, the officer would be entitled to summary judgment based
on qualified immunity because he could not reasonably have known such
conduct was constitutionally protected. The more spurious the retaliatory-
arrest claim, the more likely the defendant officer will be able to avail him-
self of the protections offered by qualified immunity by arguing that the
creatively pleaded First Amendment right is not "clearly established."
CONCLUSION
The First Amendment protects rights at the very heart of the American
democratic experiment"' and these rights are deserving of the most zealous
protection. Neither Hartman, nor the judicially defined elements of the
claim, nor the pre-Hartman decisions of the Second and Eleventh Circuits,
should compel courts to find the presence of probable cause preclusive in an
action for retaliatory arrest. A strong desire to screen spurious claims from
the courts and to protect government agents from vexatious litigation also
does not favor imposition of the no-probable-cause rule. Indeed, courts re-
jecting the no-probable-cause rule are not only capable of handling First
Amendment retaliation claims-individually and in the aggregate-but are
advancing important constitutional values.
113. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462-63 (1987) ("The freedom of individuals
verbally to oppose or challenge police action without thereby risking arrest is one of the principal char-
acteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a police state'"); McCurdy v. Montgomery
County, 240 F.3d 512, 520 (6th Cir. 2001) ("Since the day the ink dried on the Bill of Rights, [t]he right
of an American citizen to criticize public officials and policies ... is the central meaning of the First
Amendment." (alterations in original) (quoting Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 904)
(1975) (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual Message to Congress
(January 6, 1941), in THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONs 646, 646 (Fred R, Shapiro ed., 2006) ("In the
future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential
human freedoms. The first is freedom of speech and expression-everywhere in the world.").
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